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Abstract: Justifying involuntary psychiatric treatment
on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity
is controversial because there are questions about the
meaning and utility of the concept in this context. There
are complexities to using capacity in this way, which are
further amplified in the community outpatient setting
compared with acute inpatient care. A richer account
of capacity, its meanings, and practical applications in
context, is required. This qualitative study sought to
build inductively a model of capacity in the context of
involuntary outpatient psychiatric treatment, based on
38 interviews with stakeholders from New South Wales,
Australia. The emergent model incorporates multiple
“capacities”: to manage illness, for self-care, and to
maintain social roles. It identifies core values that correspond with the “capabilities approach,” elaborating
the justifications and processes of involuntary outpatient psychiatric treatment. This proposed model of
“capability” may have a range of benefits to sound and
ethical practice and scrutiny of systems of involuntary
outpatient treatment.
Keywords: qualitative research, community mental
health care, capabilities, ethics, mental health law
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J

ustifying involuntary psychiatric treatment on the basis of a judgment that a person
lacks capacity is usually expressed in terms of
a person’s ability to make a decision about
his or her health and treatment. Typically, this
relates to the ability to refuse treatment. Exactly
what “capacity” means, however, and how one
determines when another individual lacks capacity, or lacks sufficient capacity, in this context is
particularly controversial, with the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2014) insisting that involuntary treatment be
abandoned altogether and capacity tests avoided.
Capacity is a concept that has multiple meanings and applications across different disciplines
and settings, including in the context of mental illness and treatment (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2014; Banner, 2012; Okai et al., 2007;
Owen, David, et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen,
Richardson et al., 2009). In clinical and legal domains, capacity is often used synonymously with
the term “competence” and approaches to both
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concepts focus on a person’s time and task-specific
decision-making ability and related processes of
decision making (Banner, 2012; Doorn, 2011). A
common approach to assessing decision-making
capacity in psychiatric and other health care
settings is a predominantly cognitive-based functional test of the capacity of a person to provide
valid consent to treatment or refusal of treatment.
Criteria used in this method seek to determine
whether a person’s mental impairment makes him
or her unable to understand information about
their health and treatment, to retain and use that
information to make and justify a decision, and
to communicate a choice about treatment (Doorn,
2011; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995; Owen, David,
et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen, et al., 2009).
Philosophical critiques frequently interrogate
the moral and political relevance of capacity
determinations as a justification for coercive use
of psychiatric power by the state to implement
psychiatric treatment (Dawson & Kampf, 2006;
Sullivan & Mullen, 2012; Szmukler & Dawson,
2011). In this regard, capacity is viewed through
its interplay with principles of autonomy, beneficence, dignity, and equity—specifically, how
capacity might frame bioethical and human rights
approaches to involuntary psychiatric treatment
and how it could protect or enhance relevant
principles in practice (Australian Law Reform
Commission, 2014; Doorn, 2011; Owen, David
et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen et al., 2009).
In this context, contemporary capacity-based
justifications for involuntary treatment are often
contrasted with more traditional legal justifications based on risk of harm.
Recent proposals for reform in mental health
law have echoed this philosophical shift, with
increasing interest in capacity-based criteria for
involuntary psychiatric treatment in place of
the traditional risk-based systems (Burns, 2011;
Fistein et al., 2009; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011).
There are a number of arguments that would seem
to justify this proposal. The first is that it would
make mental health law consistent with other
capacity-based approaches to health and welfare
decision making. The second is that it would overcome many of the drawbacks of risk-based laws,
which are often seen as discriminatory—stigmatiz-

ing people living with mental illness as dangerous
and disrespecting their autonomy (Link, Castille,
& Stuber, 2008; Ryan, Nielssen, Paton, & Large,
2010; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). In practical
terms, laws that take a capacity-based approach to
involuntary treatment include either those where
a functional test of decision-making ability is the
primary feature, those that integrate capacity
principles with primarily risk-based criteria (Fistein et al., 2009), or those which seek to merge
capacity and risk criteria together (Szmukler &
Dawson, 2011).
There are, however, a number of complexities and contentions associated with the use of
capacity to justify and operationalize involuntary
treatment. The current cognitive approach to
the criteria for capacity testing relies on an assumption that it is “an objectively measurable
phenomenon” (Banner, 2012, p. 1040; United
Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, 2014). The reality is that all
definitions and applications of capacity involve
intrinsically normative judgments and inevitably
reflect the influence of context and values (Doorn,
2011; Radden, 2003; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011).
Moreover, it is argued that the concept of capacity can be difficult to conceptualize and to put
into practice, and at times may be misunderstood
or misapplied (Select Committee on the Mental
Capacity Act 2005, 2014; Williamson, 2011).
Indeed, a recent review of the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 (England and Wales) identified these
issues were part of the poor implementation of
the act so far: “It is sometimes used to support
non-intervention or poor care, leaving vulnerable
adults exposed to risk of harm. In some cases it is
because professionals struggle to understand how
to apply the principle in practice” (Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2014, p.
8). It is also suggested that changing from risk to
capacity-based approaches to decision making will
change the types and rates of use of involuntary
treatment (Milne, O’Brien, & McKenna, 2009;
Dawson, 2006), and that this, in turn, may affect
other social systems (Dawson, 2006).
All these critiques are amplified in the context of
community-based mental health care. Unlike acute
and severe disturbances of mental state requiring
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involuntary inpatient hospital admission, people
may have variable levels of capacity over longer
periods of time requiring very different levels of
care (Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). Recognizing
the dynamic and context-sensitive nature of capacity is therefore critical to the long-term care of
people living with mental illness. This is because
conceptualization and application of capacity are
pertinent to how the law and clinicians should
respond to severe and enduring mental illness in
the community setting. Furthermore, inappropriate attribution of incapacity to a capable person,
or vice versa, may undermine their care, dignity,
and rights (Radden, 2002).
We require an account of capacity in a community mental health care setting that is richer
and more contextualized than extant medicolegal
and theoretical constructs (Doorn, 2011; Owen,
Freyenhagen, et al., 2009; Szmukler & Dawson,
2011). Most data about capacity relates to the
setting of severe and psychotic mental illness.
Moreover, decisions about capacity in ambulatory psychiatric care are more complex than acute
inpatient care, where the critical issue is usually
dangerousness or risk of harm. Capacity may be
understood and applied in different ways by different professionals, which in turn affects patients
and carers. We, therefore, require data that help
to provide a better understanding of capacity in
the setting of severe and persistent mental illness
and its ongoing management in the community.
In light of this imperative, this qualitative study
aimed to derive a comprehensive model of capacity
in involuntary outpatient treatment that is credible
and meaningful among patients, caregivers, clinicians, and legal decision makers, and better reflects
the ways that capacity is constructed in clinical
practice, policy and law. The inductive nature of
qualitative research, where no prior assumptions
are made about findings and where analysis is open
to emergent issues, is well-suited to examining real
world constructions of complex concepts such as
capacity and experiences of complex processes,
such as involuntary psychiatric treatment in the
community setting.
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Methods
This qualitative study was conducted in New
South Wales (NSW), Australia, and referred to
involuntary outpatient “community treatment
orders” (CTOs) under the Mental Health Act
2007 (NSW). The preliminary findings of the study
were submitted as a report to the funding body
and published online; however, this paper provides
a more substantive and extended descriptive and
philosophical account of the research findings and
develops a normative alternative to the current
conceptualization of capacity. Like other Australian and many international jurisdictions, NSW
involuntary treatment law currently provides
that unconsented psychiatric treatment cannot be
delivered unless, owing to a mental illness (as defined in the act), a person requires protection from
serious harm to self or others and that involuntary
treatment represents the least restrictive route to
safe and effective care. Recent reforms have added
capacity considerations to the principles that are to
be put in to practice in the care and treatment of
people under the Act. Decisions on CTO applications are made by an independent Mental Health
Review Tribunal (MHRT), based on applications
from a clinician, a mental health facility director,
and/or a primary carer of a person.
This study examined clinical and legal CTO
decision making and patient and carer lived experiences. It aimed to inductively build a model of
“capacity” in the context of CTOs (as well as models of “risk” and people’s lived experiences, which
are reported elsewhere; Light et al., 2014; Light et
al., 2015) and to identify potential improvements
to CTO processes. The research questions were
formulated as: How do mental health professionals, patients, caregivers, and legal decision makers
conceptualize “capacity” in the context of decisions about involuntary psychiatric treatment in
the community setting? and Can a comprehensive
model of “capacity” that is consensually valid
across participant groups be formulated?

Participants and Recruitment
Participants were recruited using a theoretical,
purposive method of sampling, and comprised
four groups: patients currently or previously on

36 ■

PPP / Vol. 23, No. 1 / March 2016

a CTO, relatives or carers of a person subject to
a CTO, community mental health clinicians, and
members of the legal body oversighting involuntary psychiatric treatment (the MHRT).
The investigators sought to build a maximum
variation, rather than representative, sample in
which as many different subgroups of different
participant groups are included. This does not
allow justification of claims to generalizability of
study findings. Rather, it enabled the investigators to describe and understand a rich and varied
range of experiences and perspectives and to build
a comprehensive model of capacity in the context
of involuntary psychiatric treatment in a community setting. In the patient and carer groups,
the study aimed to recruit people with current or
past experience CTOs, those ordered in different
geographic locations, or those relating to people
with different diagnoses of mental illness. The
study also sought to include participants from
different disciplines and professional histories in
the clinician and MHRT member groups.
Recruitment involved a variety of methods.
Clinicians were recruited through distribution of
an invitation issued by NSW health service managers. Potential participants (clinicians) were also
recruited using the “snowball” method, through
which the study was recommended to subsequent
participants through professional networks or
relationships. In the case of patient and carer
participants, an invitation was circulated through
non-government organizations (Carers NSW, the
Mental Health Coordinating Council, and NSW
Consumer Advisory Group—Mental Health Inc.).
This was further disseminated through their own
networks and individual recommendations. Patient and carer participants received $40 at interview toward costs of participation. In the case of
MHRT participants, the invitation was circulated
by the tribunal to all members. All consumer participants were clinically stable at the time of their
participation and were judged to have sufficient
capacity to freely participate in this research. Their
expressions and views were valid irrespective of
whether they were on a CTO or not.
After provision of a participant information
statement, and an opportunity for questions
about the project and the conduct of interviews,

written informed consent was obtained from each
participant. The research was conducted with the
approval of the following committees: University
of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee
(patient and carer interviews—protocol number
12583; MHRT member interviews—protocol
number 14421); Sydney Local Health Network
Ethics Review Committee (protocol number
X10–0338).

Data Collection and Analysis
The investigators conducted in-depth semistructured interviews in a variety of sites. In the
case of clinician participants, interviews were
conducted in clinical sites. MHRT participants
were interviewed either at the MHRT offices or,
where appropriate, in their other workplaces. Interviews with patient and carer participants were
held in offices of non-government organizations.
Patient participants were not recruited from or
interviewed in clinical settings because the investigators sought to maintain a clear distinction
between their voluntary participation in the study
and their involuntary treatment status.
In the conduct of the interviews, the investigators prompted the participants to speak about
their unique understanding of CTO use by
providing narrative accounts of their experience
of CTO processes. In the case of clinicians or
MHRT participants, this involved their reflection
on specific examples of decisions around CTOs
in their professional experience. In the case of
patients and carers, this involved a process of
constructing a personal narrative of their direct
and indirect experiences of the use of CTOs. The
interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and
de-identified. The data were managed using the
NVIVO9 computer program.
The analysis utilized grounded theory and inductive methods as described by Charmaz (2006),
Corbin and Strauss (2008), and Thomas (2006).
Using an a priori code of “capacity,” this involved
an initial coding process to sort and begin an
analytic account of the data, then the synthesis of
the coding into more conceptually complete categories. As the iterative process of data collection
and analysis progressed, data and codes within
and between interviews were constantly compared
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and memos written to analyze the nature of and
relationships between codes and emerging categories. This facilitated the emergence of a number
of themes, which formed the basis of the model
of capacity. The investigators sought to confirm
data saturation by triangulation of the data coded
separately by two members of the team (M.R. and
E.L.) and through discussion of the data among
the investigators and stakeholder reference group
members. Triangulation is an intrinsic aspect of
qualitative research used to establish validity and
completeness of an analysis and can involve use
of different investigators and stakeholders (as
this study did), data sources, study theories, and/
or methods (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Rosen et
al., 2012) .

Results
Participants
Five patients and six carers participated in
interviews. Six were men and five women from
metropolitan or regional/rural areas. Among either the patients or the relative of the carer were
diagnoses of schizophrenia, depression, bipolar
disorder, and anxiety. All of the CTOs under discussion were initiated from a hospital, although
renewals of CTOs in a community setting were
also discussed at interview. Six of the interviews
related to CTOs currently in place, and the other
CTOs had either lapsed or the status of the CTO
was unknown to the interviewee. One issue of note
was the difficulties in recruiting patients subject
to CTOs through non-clinical pathways. In opting not to recruit through treating clinicians, the
yield of suitable participants was lower than anticipated. Moreover, several suitable participants
later withdrew or were unable to participate.
Twelve MHRT members participated in the
interviews. Of these five were women and seven
were men. Four were psychiatrists, four were
lawyers, and four were from social work, nursing,
psychology, and mental health service administration fields. Fifteen clinicians participated in
interviews; three psychiatrists, eight nurses, two
social workers, one psychologist, and one occupational therapist (four men and eleven women).
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The various clinicians had worked in inpatient and
community mental health settings and their clinical
loads included general adult mental health, youth
mental health, older person’s mental health, and
Aboriginal mental health. Participants worked in
regional and metropolitan settings.

Perspectives on Capacity
Analysis of participant accounts of “capacity” revealed a range of practical and conceptual
themes. It also found significant overlaps in how
groups of participants think about “capacity,”
although each group emphasized different aspects
of it. This may have been because ideas about what
gives life meaning are broadly shared and derive
from sedimented values and norms (Nussbaum &
Sen, 1993). Alternatively, this may have reflected
the influence of hegemonic institutional norms.
This necessitated our acknowledgement that many
participants may have been speaking of socially
constructed and nomothetic notions of the good
life. Clinicians and MHRT member views were
often based on legal and medical constructions
relating to the ability to make decisions about
health and treatment. They often raised epistemic
concerns about how to conceptualize capacity, and
were mindful of the different discourses around
the phenomenon, including in their own ways of
thinking. Many patients and caregivers shared
these perspectives, but overall were more likely to
emphasize capacities to manage illness and how
severe mental illness often impaired capacity to
pursue life goals and partake a social role. As the
analysis progressed, these discourses on capacity
were systematically integrated to derive a model of
capacity in the context of outpatient involuntary
psychiatric treatment.
The model of capacity identified three domains:
“manage illness,” “self-care,” and “maintain
social roles.”
Manage illness. The capacity to manage one’s
mental illness was a key feature of perspectives on
capacity among all participant groups. It incorporated the ability to recognize the features of illness,
including early signs of recurrence; acknowledge
the effect of illness on thought, emotion, and behavior; engage and negotiate with a clinical service
and domains of treatment (including awareness of
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potential benefits and harms from psychotropic
treatments); and participate in a “recovery”-based
model of care.
Clinicians described this capacity in both conceptual and practical terms. Conceptual capacity—akin to the medicolegal construct usually used
to assess competence in various domains—related
to a person’s ability to conceptualize and articulate
choices about their illness management. Central to
this were capabilities such as cognitive function,
judgment or insight into consequences of various
choices.
And there’s a difference when they’re actually able
to cope, to have a life, to deal with their children, to
deal with their partners, to go to work, all those things
are signposts that things are getting better, and they can
reflect, ‘I couldn’t do that then, but I can now.’ (Clinician participant)

Practical capacity concerned how a person
might deal with the daily demands of living in the
community and included negotiating to have one’s
needs met within complex systems such as health
and social services—making and communicating
choices, and sustaining social supports. Some
clinicians saw the utility of CTOs in prioritizing
the needs of patients when illness may have adversely affected their ability to access or engage
with treatment services.
when somebody is on a community treatment order,
the system expects you to keep working with them...
they have the safeguard of getting a certain priority—
you’re not going to discharge them because you’ve got
too many clients, that sort of priority. So it’s an obligation from the mental health service’s point of view.
(Clinician participant)

MHRT member participants had similar perspectives on capacity to manage illness, including
the themes of dealing with the intrinsic limitations
of severe mental illness (frequently focused on
legalistic questions of mental capacity to decide
about treatment and of what is often called “lack
of insight”) and of those presented by the mental
health system (and in which CTOs acted as a form
of advocacy for patient need).
The capacity to manage mental illness was a
prominent theme among patient and carer perspectives on capacity. This included “knowing
the illness”: recognizing signs of deterioration in

heath, and learning the effect of certain treatments
on symptoms; understanding the language and
processes of mental health care including diagnoses, treatments, and health services, as well as
involuntary treatment; and recognizing the need
for knowledge and/or advocacy to participate in
these health and medicolegal systems.
Because it [the medication] takes about two or three
weeks to work …it really takes a long time. And I’m
glad I take the tablets, I don’t want to take the injection,
because with the tablets I know I’ve got it every day, I
know it’s in my system. (Patient participant)
He said, “I respond to my old medication, so that’s
what I think I need.” So he’s very, very smart. And
there was some medication they wanted to put him
on, and he refused, he said ‘I don’t want that.’ And he
does research himself, so he’s read the Mental Health
Act and everything. So he knows what works for him.
(Carer participant)

Being able to communicate about the illness
was an integral part of this capacity, particularly
to engage with clinicians about treatment and/or
in involuntary treatment processes. The concept
of “recovery,” as against other forms of improvement, was also evident in many consumer and
carer perspectives on managing illness. The tenets
of the “recovery approach”—including hope,
secure base, self, supportive relationships, empowerment and inclusion, coping strategies, and
meaning—may have influenced some participants,
whereas others may have seen this in simple terms
of optimism or hope. Patient participants spoke
about aspirational goals of recovery from illness
as well as short-term and longer term goals for
symptom control or restoring vocational roles.
I think I’m going to learn to live with it, and live
with it well, because I’m 42 and I’m quite healthy for
my age, and I’m not silly, I reckon I can go back to work
in a couple of years when I get stronger, and that’s my
goal…it made me realize that hey you know, I can get
rid of this illness; or not get rid of it, but I can stop the
voices. And that was the main thing, the voices was the
main thing. (Patient participant)

Self-care. Being able to care for one’s self
emerged in the capacity discourses of all participant groups, referring to a person’s ability to
maintain physical well-being and healthy lifestyle
choices, and to establish and maintain a suitable
personal environment as well as a network of
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professional and interpersonal caregivers. Patient
and carer participant accounts highlighted that
being able to cope with the effects of illness, to
meet interpersonal and health needs, and to live
independently in the community were importance
aspects of self-care. Severe mental illness could
disrupt this capacity, either through the problems
of disorganization, apathy, amotivation, or avolition or through the disruptive effects of psychosis.
So the simple thing like going to buy food, it’s just
everything you know. If he’s so disturbed by the voices,
he’ll just have to lay down on the bed and stay there, he
just can’t do anything. (Carer participant)

MHRT member accounts included similar
quality-of-life themes and explained how the
absence of capacity for self-care emerged as the
propensity for neglect (for example, of personal
care or living conditions), which was a concept
that frequently featured in deliberations on questions of involuntary community treatment.
Some case managers are very close to their clients,
and they go and visit the client, with their permission
of course, just to ensure that they are taking their medication.…But you will have a sense of how the client is
living in the home environment, so whether the place
is looked after, whether the client’s done the washing,
see whether there are dishes in the sink, and talk to the
neighbors, they will give you an indication as to whether
or not they have received any complaints; take a walk
with them down the street to the café that they go to,
you get a sense of their surroundings as well, moving
away from the home to a place outside. So those sorts
of things come into play [in CTO decision-making].
(MHRT member participant)

Clinicians also regarded the impairment of the
capacity to prioritize and maintain self-care as a
significant concern in considerations of treating
severe mental illness. In addition to attending to instrumental needs, some clinicians also saw that an
aspiration of treatment was to facilitate the pleasurable or hedonic experience of participating in
different aspects of life. One clinician participant
regarded the consumer’s perspective of what happiness they sought from life as an important focus
of care: “I think first of all I’d want to know what
the client considers important to their happiness
and well-being, and that’s different for everyone.”
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Maintain social roles. Participant perspectives on capacity also depicted the capability to
maintain social roles. This included being able to
establish and maintain interpersonal, vocational,
and educational functioning; to meet obligations
to others in the community; and to maintain harmonious and nurturing relationships with family,
friends, and acquaintances.
Throughout their interviews, patient and carer
participants spoke about the disabling effects of severe illness on a person’s ability to pursue life goals
and engage in a social role. These goal-focused
capacities included establishing and maintaining
relationships, which provided scope for support
and interpersonal networks; seeking and maintaining financial independence; participating in education and employment; and fulfilling obligations
to others (whether it be interpersonal, financial,
or community relationships). Many such goals
related to personal achievements and milestones,
or more generally to being able to survive and
flourish in the community.
I go to work and get sick and then I come back and
then I’m not able to function as well as I could and I
lose my job. (Patient participant)

A carer participant highlighted how the effects
of severe mental illness meant that, for some
people, programs to support people’s social participation—such as peer support or employment
programs—were still out of reach:
I know from speaking to other people, other parents,
that they feel the same as I do about their son. You’ve
got to be pretty high functioning to go and join most of
these groups, and most of them aren’t. So the resources
are there … but they’re not meeting the needs of everyone, it’s only a small functioning group that are using
them. (Carer participant)

MHRT member and clinician accounts also
explored how illness frequently disrupted a person’s practical capacity and ability to maintain a
social role. Practical capacity involved being able
to apply skills in dealing with the complexities of
the social system—comparable with the notions
of “phronesis” (Kraut, 2014) and the capacity to
partake in citizenship—and was part of some of
the considerations about treatment aims.
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This woman was a registered nurse, and very smart
lady and she had a husband, she had children, before
the illness debilitated her. So we want to get … [her]
involved with society, because she’s very withdrawn.
(Clinician participant)

Some participants also commented on the
sometimes profoundly disabling effects of “negative symptoms” of illness, which might undermine
other people’s perceptions of the credibility of a
person’s plans for themselves or destabilize their
fulfilment of expressed intentions to engage in life.
Look I don’t think you can order people to go to
TAFE [technical and further education], one of the problems, particularly with schizophrenia for example, is
you have people with prominent negative symptoms,…
Their executive functioning skills and planning skills are
so impaired, even if they know what would be a good
thing for them, they just can’t quite organize it. (MHRT
member participant)

As part of deliberations on such issues, some
clinicians recognized the need for a patient to
have the capacity to manage the adversity often
brought into their lives by illness, particularly to
manage losses such as the loss of agency, social
role, or status.

Discussion
This study sought to describe how patients, carers, clinicians, and MHRT members conceptualize
“capacity” and to use this empirical data to derive
a model of capacity in the context of involuntary
psychiatric treatment in the community setting.
The model of capacity described incorporates a
person’s multiple capacities to manage illness,
for self-care, and to maintain social roles. It is
grounded in the participants’ lived experiences of
many aspects of severe mental illness and of outpatient involuntary psychiatric treatment. It was
noteworthy that many participants were aware
of, and thoughtful about, the epistemic, ethical,
policy, and practical issues associated with the
conceptualization and application of capacity,
including functional capacity testing and possible
approaches to mental health law. What emerged
in our findings, however, were broader concerns
about the extant conceptualization and construction of capacity in this setting. As such, they offer a

number of opportunities to reappraise the practical
application of “capacity” in this particular context, as well as helping to frame debate on relevant
ethical and policy concerns. No qualitative work
can make claims to generalizability; however, this
research indicates dissonance between the traditional cognitive approach of “capacity” and the,
arguably idiographic, expanded notion of capacity
described by this group. Within the setting of involuntary psychiatric treatment in the community
in NSW, the traditional cognitive-focused notion
of capacity was an incomplete account of what all
participants conceptualized.

Decision Making about Involuntary
Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment
Capacity figures significantly in clinical and
legal approaches to the treatment (voluntary and
involuntary) of people living with severe and
enduring mental illnesses. Our account of a “realworld” model of capacity, that is particular to
involuntary psychiatric treatment in the community, improves our understanding of how people
think about and apply this concept in practice. The
model incorporates the wide range of perspectives
held among different stakeholders, each of whom
bring diverse and overlapping experiences to bear
on their understandings of capacity. It also accommodates both points of agreement and divergence
and as such provides a robust framework to improve applications of capacity in this setting. The
model was developed by careful identification of
points of overlap among participant groups and
consideration of the origins of points of difference
from epistemic and ontological perspectives. In
doing so, it provides a possible mechanism for
improving communication between patients, families, clinicians, and tribunal members about the
rationale for and limits of involuntary treatment
in community settings, including the articulation
of treatment goals and plans that are implemented
under involuntary orders. It could also increase
the transparency and accountability of decisions
about involuntary (and voluntary) treatment and
the systems through which they are implemented.
Indeed, by explicitly incorporating multiple domains of capacity, this model would make these
processes more inclusive, dynamic, and context
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specific. Each of the capacity domains would not
have the same significance in every situation and
with every patient. Rather, the weight attached to
each capacity domain would depend on who it
involves (e.g., the patient, the carer, the clinician,
or legal decision maker) and the context (e.g., the
clinical diagnoses, history, or setting).
Importantly, we believe the instrumental value
of this model of capacity has potential in any
jurisdiction, regardless of its specific legislative
criteria for decisions about involuntary community treatment. Whether laws are predominately
risk based (as was the setting of this empirical
study) or use forms of functional decision-making
capacity testing, this model is useful to improving
communication between stakeholders, treatment
planning, and the transparency of these processes.
Research into decision making under mental
health legislation shows that the complexity of
such processes can lead to decision makers substituting their own criteria for the statutory criteria, based on an analysis of what lay behind the
intentions of the law (Perkins, 2011). The results
of this study help us to understand what is in the
minds of decision makers and suggest that, even
when mindful of statutory criteria, stakeholders
are able to articulate and engage with other matters, including the health and social context in
which such legal decisions are embedded (Carney
& Beaupert, 2008). In addition, the model that
we have proposed may also be useful in elaborating areas of the currently applied capacity testing
criteria that are contested and complex (Banner,
2012; Doorn, 2011; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011),
by depicting some of the values and context relevant to deliberations over involuntary outpatient
psychiatric treatment.
In promoting the benefits of an empirically
derived model of capacity, it is important to distinguish it from conceptualizations of risk of harm
as the moral justification for coercive psychiatric
treatment. In this regard, it is noteworthy that all
of the participants in this qualitative study spoke
of the risks of harm faced and posed by people living in the community with a severe and persistent
mental illness (Light et al., 2015). Yet they readily
distinguished this from the disabilities or incapacities consequent upon such an illness.
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Capacity or “Capability”?
Our examination of the lived experiences and
perspectives of involuntary psychiatric treatment
in the community demonstrates how often and
how differently the notion of capacity arises in
health care decision making and why a richer understanding of the concept is necessary for sound
and ethical practice.
What is, perhaps, most striking about our data
is that the model of capacity that emerges is not
defined solely in the type of cognitive terms that
dominate traditional medicolegal constructions of
capacity and accepted processes of substituted or
proxy decision making. The model that emerges
from our research describes a series of capabilities that extend the traditional cognitive-focused
approaches of “capacity.” We believe that by
privileging cognitive capability over others, the
‘capacity’ approach is only a partial account of
what this group of participants conceptualize
when deliberating questions in community mental health care. Its dimensions of interpersonal
efficacy, self-respect, self-care, and engaging in a
social role direct us toward a notion of the “telos”
or purposes of psychiatric treatment and the notion of a basic ethic of the psychiatric project.
This poses the question: What is it that we seek
to achieve through psychiatric treatment? Implicit
in the narratives of the participants was that the
aspiration of coercive treatment should be to
restore and scaffold fundamental capabilities to
pursue a “good life,” however socially constructed
and contextualized. This would seem to be a liberal egalitarian perspective, as described by John
Rawls (1971). This invites our reconsideration
of the goals of mental health care—specifically,
whether treatment of psychiatric disorder serves
as a means of redressing the imbalances brought
about by “the natural lottery” (Daniels 1985). In
other words, whether coercive psychiatric treatment should be instrumental in compensating for
the effects of severe mental illness on a person’s
ability to vie for social goods and to pursue a
life’s journey.
Our results suggest there may be merit in reframing or extending the notion of capacity(s) in
this context in terms of capability(s), as outlined
by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s elaboration of
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Rawls and of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach
to welfare economics and human development
(Sen, 1985) provides a conceptual framework
to situate our emergent theory of the purpose of
psychiatric treatment. Nussbaum describes ten
capabilities that are necessary for one to live a life
with dignity—using this to provide an account of
the fundamental sociopolitical entitlements that
are central to the liberal egalitarian conception
of social justice: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions;
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play;
and control over one’s environment (political and
material) (Nussbaum, 2006). These seem to be universalist assumptions; they have broad empirical
support from studies in diverse communities and
cultures (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993) and it is difficult
to envisage a historical or cultural setting where
these were not instrumental goods. In her writing,
Nussbaum describes the implications that the capability approach would have for the development
of policies concerning disability (including people
with “mental impairment” or “mental disability”),
noting that public policy would need to facilitate
and protect a person’s access to the capabilities
while leaving the individual concerned the choice
about whether to exercise or realize those capabilities. Thus, where a person needs assistance a
capabilities approach would mandate that this
should be provided in such a way that invites
the person to participate as much as possible in
decision making and choices. This would seem
to parallel the commonly held view that coercive
psychiatric treatment, ultimately, aspires to enable
the patient to exercise a right to negative liberty
through realization of autonomous choice. Importantly, when using the terms “mental impairment”
and “mental disability,” Nussbaum explains that
she is referring to the terrain occupied by both
“cognitive” disabilities and “mental illnesses”
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 423). Further, she argues
that the “lives of citizens with mental impairments,
and of those who care for them, will continue to
be unusually difficult lives. …[T]he lives of either
people with disabilities or their caregivers need not
contain the stigma and insult and the inordinate
burdens that they used to contain ubiquitously,
and now often still contain” (Nussbaum, 2006, p.

222). As such, her thesis is that a “decent” society
will organize public policy that is supportive and
inclusive of such lives, avoids further marginalizing and stigmatizing, and gives people as much
access to the capabilities as possible. This idea is
particularly salient with regards to involuntary
psychiatric treatment, where stigma remains a
feature of the experience of severe and persistent
mental illness and its treatment (Goffman, 1963;
Link et al., 2008).

Capabilities and Mental Health
The capabilities approach has been applied
worldwide in numerous mental and public health
projects, including work to devise new ways of
measuring outcome in public and social health
programs. In an ongoing project seeking to operationalize the capabilities approach to welfare
economics, Anand et al. (2013) have developed
a variety of ways in which capabilities can be
measured, including applications to health outcomes measurement. In an adaption of this work,
Lorgelly, Lorimer, Fenwick, and Briggs (2008)
used the capability approach to develop an instrument for evaluating public health interventions.
They posited that complex social and public health
interventions have a diverse range of outcomes not
captured by the quality-adjusted life-years framework commonly used in health economics, and
found the capability approach offered a richer set
of dimensions. Simon et al. also adapted Anand’s
work to develop a capabilities-based instrument
that would enable a more comprehensive measurement of important mental health outcomes as part
of their study of CTOs in England. Their initial
evaluation seems to demonstrate the feasibility and
validity of directly utilizing measures of human
capabilities as an approach to measurement of
outcome in psychiatric care. Each of the projects
has sought to find instruments able to account
for all of the outcomes of “interest/importance”
in health care (Lorgelly et al., 2008), arguing that
capabilities-based tools provide such a measure.
The capabilities approach has value and utility
in mental health well beyond the assessment of
health care interventions, providing the basis for
rigorous reconceptualizations of key concepts in
the field such as “social integration” and “recov-
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ery.” Ware et al, for example, used it as a framework to address the continuing social exclusion
of people living with mental illness, providing
the basis for an approach to social integration
which casts persons with psychiatric disabilities
as social agents and envisions flourishing, rather
than simple functioning, as an outcome (Ware,
Hopper, Tugenberg, Dickey, & Fisher, 2007).
Similarly, Hopper (2007) uses the capabilities approach to inform a new approach to “recovery,”
arguing that a capabilities-informed mental health
program enables people to thrive, not just survive:
by re-enfranchising agency, redressing material
and symbolic disadvantage, and raising the bar
on fundamental entitlements.
In our findings, participant perspectives of “capacity” and involuntary outpatient treatment were
frequently concerned with impairments of capabilities arising from mental illness that precluded
or compromised a dignified life. The model that
we propose identifies core values that correspond
with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and other’s
efforts to apply it in certain contexts. It enlightens
our understanding of how the state’s intervention
in the lives of some citizens—in this case involuntary outpatient treatment—might seek to protect
or restore a person’s agency (in the health care
system, in society): seeking to mitigate the effects
of mental illness and enable a person’s capability
to maintain well-being, to experience pleasure,
pursue a life’s journey, maintain interpersonal
supportive relationships, manage the adversity
often brought into one’s life owing to illness (such
as loss of agency, social role, or status), and civic
participation seem to be the moral foundation of
that intervention.
This proposed model of “capability” in the
context of involuntary outpatient psychiatric
treatment moves beyond current medicolegal
constructs of task-specific assessment of competence in relation to treatment decisions and may
have a range of benefits: improving communication between stakeholders, providing a more
comprehensive framework for decision making
about involuntary orders and specified treatment
plans, and improving the transparency of those
processes. Perhaps most important, we believe
that this model may also increase scrutiny on the
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justifications for and implementation of systems of
involuntary outpatient treatment. What cannot be
justified by this research is the use of the capabilities approach as criteria to determine when coercion or usurpation of negative rights is justified.
There is currently no clear consensus about the
instrumental value of CTOs and what we seek
to achieve by using them. These are not simply
“medical” questions, but ethical ones, because
the outcomes we privilege—whether traditional
measures of efficacy and effectiveness such as
avoiding hospital readmissions, reducing hospital
stays, improving quality-adjusted life-years, or
stabilizing people’s health to enable illness insight
or treatment engagement, prioritizing communitybased over hospital-based coercive treatment,
prompting a health system response—reflect our
ideas about what it is that “matters” and what it is
we want our mental health care system to achieve
(Light, 2014). Of course, this many not simply
be a question of what we want from our mental
health care system, but what goals we also want
social and welfare systems to fulfil in this context.
The answers to these questions should not be determined solely by health professionals or regulators, but through a broad public debate informed
by a genuine understanding of the experiences of
those who suffer severe mental illness and those
who provide care for them or deliberate legally
and clinically over their lives. The “capability”
model, as a means of understanding both a moral
justification of involuntary psychiatric treatment
and the telos of psychiatric treatment, elaborates
what the community values as important in the
provision of healthcare for those living with severe
and enduring mental illness.
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